國(guó)家應(yīng)對(duì)氣候變化戰(zhàn)略研究和國(guó)際合作中心主任認(rèn)為，不同于石油，中國(guó)不能依靠進(jìn)口水資源來(lái)發(fā)展，因此水安全將決定該國(guó)未來(lái)的能源結(jié)構(gòu)

過(guò)去我們說(shuō)中國(guó)是一個(gè)能源缺乏、土地缺乏的國(guó)家，但很少把中國(guó)看做一個(gè)缺水的國(guó)家。圖片來(lái)源：emdurso

 

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中國(guó)水危機(jī)：為何水安全比能源安全更重要？

李俊峰：中國(guó)是一個(gè)能源缺乏的國(guó)家，也是一個(gè)水資源缺乏的國(guó)家。水安全和能源安全都很重要且息息相關(guān)，但是水安全比能源安全更重要、更復(fù)雜，也更需要引起重視。從國(guó)家層面看，中國(guó)石油60%依賴(lài)進(jìn)口，仍可維系；但若10%的淡水資源需要進(jìn)口，對(duì)于中國(guó)這樣的人口大國(guó)、制造業(yè)大國(guó)而言，將是不可想象的。

 

中國(guó)水危機(jī)：中國(guó)目前正在實(shí)施一項(xiàng)雄心勃勃的能源轉(zhuǎn)型計(jì)劃，其中最重要的一項(xiàng)任務(wù)就是在2050年前實(shí)現(xiàn)煤炭使用減半。在減煤過(guò)程中，水將發(fā)揮怎樣的作用？

李俊峰：對(duì)中國(guó)而言，無(wú)論是“高煤”還是“低煤”時(shí)代，能源與水都密不可分。中國(guó)未來(lái)的能源布局應(yīng)當(dāng)將水作為一個(gè)重要的考慮因素。按目前的設(shè)想，我們希望煤炭使用量能夠每年減一個(gè)百分點(diǎn)，其他能源的比例每年增加一個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。

 

煤炭開(kāi)采、洗煤、燃煤發(fā)電、冷卻、除塵、排渣等環(huán)節(jié)，都需要大量的水。有人可能會(huì)認(rèn)為，減少煤炭使用會(huì)節(jié)省大量的水。但我們應(yīng)該注意到，一些替代能源同樣需要消耗大量的水。

 

以頁(yè)巖氣為例，中國(guó)計(jì)劃天然氣和頁(yè)巖氣年產(chǎn)量在2030年前達(dá)到4000億立方米，僅開(kāi)采環(huán)節(jié)每年就要消耗至少150億立方米淡水。燃煤發(fā)電和燃?xì)獍l(fā)電站都是中國(guó)的耗水大戶(hù)。風(fēng)能和太陽(yáng)能項(xiàng)目也離不開(kāi)水。

 

中國(guó)水危機(jī)：如你所說(shuō)，所有能源都離不開(kāi)水。根據(jù)現(xiàn)行的減煤計(jì)劃，在能源轉(zhuǎn)型后，能源耗水量是否會(huì)減少？

李俊峰：如果用天然氣或核電替代煤，耗水量可能減不了太多。因?yàn)樘烊粴忾_(kāi)采、核電冷卻都需要大量的水，核電比煤電用水還多。

 

中國(guó)目前的能源結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整是“被動(dòng)的”受制于水資源的制約。煤和煤化工都要以水資源來(lái)定，核電也是如此。核電所需的大量冷卻水限制了它的選址，沿海核電站可以用海水冷卻，內(nèi)陸呢？拋開(kāi)安全問(wèn)題，在內(nèi)陸發(fā)展核電只能建在大江大河上。海洋干枯的可能性很小，但內(nèi)陸河湖干涸我們已經(jīng)目睹很多了。未來(lái)能源選址、能源種類(lèi)選擇，都不得不考慮水的制約性。

 

中國(guó)水危機(jī)：煤炭產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展已經(jīng)強(qiáng)調(diào)“以水定煤”。現(xiàn)行的能源規(guī)劃是否已經(jīng)將水安全納入其中？

李俊峰：現(xiàn)在還沒(méi)有這么看待。我們過(guò)去對(duì)水資源沒(méi)有那么重視，覺(jué)得水是天上掉下來(lái)的。過(guò)去我們說(shuō)中國(guó)是一個(gè)能源缺乏、土地缺乏的國(guó)家，但很少把中國(guó)看做一個(gè)缺水的國(guó)家。其實(shí)中國(guó)的水資源絕不豐富，并且利用的不好，污染很多。

 

但是，現(xiàn)在應(yīng)該是已經(jīng)開(kāi)始考慮這個(gè)問(wèn)題了。從中央來(lái)說(shuō)，李克強(qiáng)總理在“兩會(huì)”上提出向水污染、大氣污染、土壤污染“宣戰(zhàn)”。中央很快出了“大氣十條”，現(xiàn)在國(guó)家發(fā)改委等部門(mén)也在緊鑼密鼓地編制“水十條”。可以說(shuō)，現(xiàn)在對(duì)水的關(guān)注度已經(jīng)提高到一個(gè)很高的水平上。

 

中國(guó)水危機(jī)：越來(lái)越多的科學(xué)研究顯示，氣候變化會(huì)對(duì)中國(guó)的水資源分布產(chǎn)生影響。這會(huì)否影響未來(lái)的能源決策？

李俊峰：短期看，水資源的地理分布限制著能源項(xiàng)目的選址。這一點(diǎn)已經(jīng)在能源項(xiàng)目的前期規(guī)劃中得到清晰體現(xiàn)——新項(xiàng)目需要在工程書(shū)中精確計(jì)算耗水量、明確水源供應(yīng)渠道和應(yīng)急水源方案。

 

長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)看，能源布局不得不考慮氣候變化因素的影響。國(guó)家氣候中心曾預(yù)測(cè)說(shuō)，中國(guó)將從“南澇北旱”的格局逐漸轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)?ldquo;南旱北澇”。顯然，降水分布的變化將對(duì)中國(guó)未來(lái)20至30年的能源格局產(chǎn)生重大影響。

 

以核電站為例，在核電站60年的運(yùn)行周期里，氣候變化的影響會(huì)比較清晰了�，F(xiàn)在要在安徽、江西等內(nèi)陸省份規(guī)劃核電站，就是希望使用長(zhǎng)江和鄱陽(yáng)湖的水源。單位未來(lái)真的有那么多水可用嗎？我持懷疑態(tài)度。鄱陽(yáng)湖經(jīng)常干涸，里面是可以放牧的。

 

中國(guó)水危機(jī)：現(xiàn)在公眾的“反核”聲音很大，核電規(guī)劃會(huì)否擱置？

李俊峰：就我的觀察，核電如果現(xiàn)在不建，那么以后可能會(huì)更困難。核電未來(lái)的發(fā)展，一是取決于替代能源的發(fā)展情況，二是取決于成本。如何未來(lái)風(fēng)電、太陽(yáng)能發(fā)展地很快，核電可能想做都做不了。核電的環(huán)保措施越來(lái)越高，也增加了發(fā)電成本，削弱了核電與其他能源的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。美國(guó)現(xiàn)在的頁(yè)巖氣發(fā)電成本降到每度電5美分，風(fēng)電大概5-6美分，天然氣發(fā)電不到10美分；核電比誰(shuí)都貴，誰(shuí)還會(huì)投資？

 

在核電可有可無(wú)的問(wèn)題上，國(guó)內(nèi)有很多爭(zhēng)論。不少支持核電的專(zhuān)家說(shuō)，沒(méi)有核電無(wú)法解決中國(guó)的能源問(wèn)題。那我要問(wèn)，有核電就能解決問(wèn)題嗎？中國(guó)計(jì)劃在2020年至2030年間發(fā)展7000萬(wàn)到3億千瓦核能。中國(guó)到2030年能源需求預(yù)計(jì)要到27到30億千瓦。按這個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)，就算把全世界核電站都搬到中國(guó)，核電也只能解決中國(guó)能源消耗的不到10%。這是一個(gè)可有可無(wú)的比例。你說(shuō)核電有多重要？

 

中國(guó)水危機(jī)：“十二五”期間，中國(guó)在西南地區(qū)批復(fù)了不少大型水電項(xiàng)目。你怎么看水電在中國(guó)的發(fā)展前景？

李俊峰：過(guò)去十年是水電的黃金時(shí)期，今后十年是收尾期。中國(guó)水電的發(fā)展已經(jīng)是強(qiáng)弩之末，不是加速發(fā)展；80%的理論開(kāi)發(fā)量都已經(jīng)開(kāi)發(fā)掉了。中國(guó)現(xiàn)在的水電已經(jīng)接近2.5億千瓦，未來(lái)最多能做到3.5億千瓦。到2030年，中國(guó)大規(guī)模水電建設(shè)應(yīng)當(dāng)已經(jīng)結(jié)束。

 

中國(guó)水危機(jī)：在雅魯藏布江、瀾滄江和怒江等富有爭(zhēng)議的跨境河流上，也規(guī)劃了許多大型水電站。你做何觀察？

李俊峰：這些（水電項(xiàng)目）很可能不會(huì)開(kāi)發(fā)了。額爾齊斯河、怒江、雅魯藏布江等，地理位置遙遠(yuǎn)、地質(zhì)條件復(fù)雜、開(kāi)發(fā)成本高。許多項(xiàng)目選址在極其不穩(wěn)定的地質(zhì)帶上，還有一些處于高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的地震帶上。在這些地區(qū)繼續(xù)建水電，要慎之又慎。就像我說(shuō)的，水電的黃金開(kāi)發(fā)時(shí)期已經(jīng)過(guò)去了。

 

從政治層面看，環(huán)保意識(shí)對(duì)高層決策的影響已經(jīng)顯現(xiàn)。前任總理溫家寶在他的第二個(gè)任期里，已經(jīng)大大減緩水電項(xiàng)目批復(fù)計(jì)劃。大家都是慢慢在改變。

 

中國(guó)水危機(jī)：那么，中國(guó)未來(lái)的能源結(jié)構(gòu)將如何調(diào)整？

李俊峰：這很難預(yù)測(cè)。我們必須汲取國(guó)外的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，要兩條腿走路：一是加速非化石能源的發(fā)展，二是把化石能源弄干凈。對(duì)中國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)，最重要的是“多能互補(bǔ)”。

 

我不是反對(duì)核電，但核電只是能源發(fā)展中的一小部分。太陽(yáng)能、風(fēng)能、水能、天然氣都要繼續(xù)發(fā)展，最終過(guò)渡到非化石能源。

 

同時(shí)，我們應(yīng)當(dāng)提倡節(jié)能、提高能效。這是不得不做的。我們必須給“發(fā)展”戴上兩個(gè)“龍頭”：一是環(huán)境容量，二是能源容量。新項(xiàng)目批復(fù)必須滿足不突破環(huán)境容量、不對(duì)能源容量帶來(lái)多大損害的前提。具體到能源問(wèn)題，就不能再批復(fù)需要大量耗水的項(xiàng)目；任何一個(gè)新建設(shè)項(xiàng)目，都必須提供水源供應(yīng)的計(jì)劃和合同。

 

在寧夏，新建燃煤電廠如果想采用“水冷卻”技術(shù)，就得先找到水源。實(shí)際上，由于寧夏省的水資源基本已經(jīng)分配完，新建項(xiàng)目沒(méi)有別的選擇，不得不采用節(jié)水措施，或改用耗水較少 “空氣冷卻”技術(shù)，但這都意味著成本的增加。

 

劉虹橋，中外對(duì)話與“中國(guó)水危機(jī)”合作的水項(xiàng)目分析師。加入中外對(duì)話之前，她供職于中國(guó)領(lǐng)先的財(cái)經(jīng)媒體財(cái)新《新世紀(jì)》周刊和中國(guó)最有影響力的日?qǐng)?bào)《南方都市報(bào)》，并獲多個(gè)獎(jiǎng)項(xiàng)。

 

Liu Hongqiao (LH): Why is water security more important than energy security?

 

Li Junfeng (LJF): China has been suffering from a nationwide shortage of energy and water resources. Water and energy security are both important and closely related. However, water security is more complex, and needs more attention. China’s oil demand can be met by importing 60% of its oil from other countries, but it wouldn’t be possible to ensure freshwater supply in this way – it would be unsustainable if a highly populated, global manufacturing country like China imported 10% of its water demand.

 

LH: China is currently undertaking an ambitious energy transformation plan. One of the most urgent tasks is to cut coal use by half by 2050. How will limited water resources shape this reduction?

 

LJF: For China, whether it is in a “high coal demand era” or “low coal demand era”, energy and water are inevitably linked. For future planning of the energy mix, water must be taken into consideration as an important factor. The current plan is to reduce coal use by 1% per year, while increasing the use of alternative energy sources by the same amount.

 

Coal mining, coal washing, coal plants, cooling and slag processing all require a lot of water. So people assume that cutting down on coal use will save huge amounts of water. However, we should bear in mind that some types of alternative energy also require large water consumption.

 

Take shale gas as an example: China plans to reach 400 billion cubic metres of shale gas and natural gas production per annum by 2030. This extraction process would require at least 15 billion cubic metres of freshwater each year. Both gas-fired and coal-fired power plants are also big water consumers in China. Even wind and solar power are also water consumers.

 

LH: All energy needs water, but will the reduced share of coal in the energy mix result in less water consumption in energy production?

 

LFJ: If natural gas or nuclear were to replace coal, water consumption may remain the same or even increase because natural-gas extraction and the cooling of nuclear plants requires even more water than coal. Water availability is critical to China’s current restructuring of its energy mix. Coal and coal-to-chemical industries rely on large amounts of water. Same for nuclear power – the huge demand for water for cooling significantly limits nuclear-power expansion, meaning coastal areas are favoured over inland areas. The sea will hardly dry out, but China’s inland rivers and lakes have already been greatly depleted. Water availability will greatly impact the future selection of energy sources and their locations.

 

LH: Water availability has been factored in for coal expansion. Has this translated to the whole national energy plan?

 

LJF: Not yet… we used to take water resources for granted. China has been describing itself as a country short of land and energy but rarely do we hear that we are water scarce. In fact, water resources in China are not abundant; moreover they are not being effectively used.

 

But the situation is changing. At central government level, premier Li Keqiang has declared “war” on water pollution, air pollution and soil pollution. The National Development and Reform Commission is also working on the “Water Pollution Prevention & Control Action Plan”. This is a very positive signal from the top.

 

LH: There is growing evidence of the impact of climate change on water distribution across China. Will this influence future decision-making about energy?

 

LJF: For decision-makers, geographical water availability limits the location of energy projects in the short term. New energy projects should clearly take into account future water demand both for operational and emergency needs. In the long run, energy distribution should consider the impact of climate change and changing climate patterns. According to recent studies by scientists from both China and abroad, the current pattern of “flood in the south and drought in the north” might gradually reverse and become “drought in the south and flood in the north”. The process will be slow but will have a significant impact on China’s energy planning for the next 20 to 30 years.

 

A nuclear-power plant has an operational lifespan of around 60 years, long enough for it to be exposed to impacts from climate change. Current nuclear plants are all located in coastal provinces such as Guangdong. There are plans to locate some of the new plants to inland provinces like Anhui and Jiangxi, with the hope of drawing water from the Yangtze River and Poyang Lake. But is there really enough water in the long term? I doubt it. We have already witnessed flow interruptions in the Yellow River as well as the depletion of Poyang Lake.

 

LH: Some proposed nuclear plants have faced resistance from the public. How do you see the future of nuclear-power development in China?

 

LJF: Well, in my view, if we are not building more nuclear-power plants now, it will be more difficult to build them in the future. The future of nuclear power also depends on the future development of other alternative energies. If wind power and solar energy continue to grow fast, there will be less space for nuclear power. Cost is another factor. More stringent environmental requirements have increased the cost to develop nuclear power, making it less competitive than others. For instance, in the US, after the big fall in the cost of shale-gas extraction, no one is willing to invest in new nuclear plants.

 

Within China, there are lots of debates going on. Those who support nuclear power claim that China will not be able to achieve energy security without nuclear-power development. But is this true? China plans to develop 70-300 gigawatts of nuclear power by 2020 and 2030, while total power installation will reach 2,700 to 3,000 gigawatts by 2030. So nuclear power will only account for around 10% of total demand, making it optional rather than essential.

 

LH: Under the 12th Five-Year Plan, quite a few large-scale hydropower projects were approved in the south-west. Where do you see hydropower heading?

 

LJF: The past decade was the golden age for hydropower in China, but the next decade will see an end to this boom. In essence, China’s hydropower development is “a spent arrow”. Hydropower is no longer rapidly growing; 80% of China’s available hydropower resources have already been developed. China’s hydropower capacity has reached 250 gigawatts and is expected to increase to 350 gigawatts in the future. Hydropower development should likely reach its final stage by 2025 and by 2030 China’s massive hydropower construction should be finished.

 

LH: What about the planned large-scale hydropower expansion on transboundary rivers such as the Yarlong, Nu and Lancang rivers?

 

LJF: They are very unlikely to be developed. Many of these projects are proposed to be built in areas with extremely complex geological conditions, some even in extremely unstable zones with high risk of earthquakes. To build hydropower in those areas requires great care. As I said, the golden age for hydropower has passed. From a political perspective, the high-level decision-makers are also more and more aware of the importance of environmental protection. Former premier Wen Jiabao approved far fewer hydropower plants during his second term than his first term. Change is slow, but it is happening.

 

LH: So what do you think China’s optimum future energy mix looks like?

 

LJF: It is hard to predict, but we do have lessons to learn from other countries. We need to “walk on two legs”: one is to accelerate the development of non-fossil fuels, and the other is to make fossil energy cleaner. For China, the most important is to have a balanced energy mix.

 

I am not opposed to nuclear power, but as I said, nuclear development will only make up a small portion of total energy needs. We need to keep developing solar, wind, hydro and natural gas and eventually shift to non-fossil energy sources.

 

With regard to China’s future energy plan, we need to increase energy efficiency and save energy at the same time. Actually this is a must. We must ensure China’s economic development stays within both its environmental capacity and energy capacity. Approvals should only be given to projects with limited impacts on the environment and energy security. No more water-intensive energy projects should be implemented. Every construction project should be required to provide a water-supply plan.

 

Take Ningxia province as an example; new coal plants wanting to use water-cooling technologies must find water sources to meet their demand. In reality, water quotas in Ningxia province are almost used up, leaving little water allocation for newcomers. New plants, therefore, have no choice but to adopt the most advanced water-efficient technologies or switch to air-cooling.

 

This is an edited version of an interview published by China Water Risk

 

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"中外對(duì)話"是世界上致力于環(huán)境問(wèn)題的第一個(gè)完全雙語(yǔ)網(wǎng)站，旨在發(fā)布高質(zhì)量文章，提供雙語(yǔ)信息，促進(jìn)直接對(duì)話，為我們共同面臨的環(huán)境挑戰(zhàn)尋求解決方案。